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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
--vs. - CaseNo. 10057. 
WAYNE PEARSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant was convicted, along with one Joseph 
Newton Cummings, of the crime of escape from the Utah 
State Prison, and appeals from his conviction in the Third 
Judicial District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits the following statement of facts 
as being a more accurate record of what actually was pre-
sented in the lower court. 
On May 22, 1963, between approximately 7: 45 and 
8:00 p.m., Officer Robert Warren, a Prison guard at the 
Utah State Prison, then on duty at Tower 1, noticed two 
inmates who had climbed over both fences surrounding the 
main Prison building, head towards the prison parking lot 
(R. 35, 36). Officer Warren fired in their direction (R. 37). 
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The two prisoners got into a Comet automobile and forced 
the people who were in the automobile to get out. There-
after the prisoners drove the car out through the front gate 
of the Prison and down the road for a short distance ( R. 38, 
40 )- A State car containing Prison officers followed (R. 38, 
40) , and a short distance from the abandoned vehicle 
Joseph Newton Cummings, the accomplice of Wayne Pear-
son, the appellant herein, was found hiding in some rocks. 
Although the appellant had been shot in the back of the 
head during the escape (R. 56), he managed to continue 
his flight to his brother's home, approximately 15 miles 
away. On the 23rd of May, the next day after the escape, 
his brother called Deputy Warden Garnett Fitzgerald and 
indicated that the appellant was ready to turn himself in 
(R. 44). 
At the time of trial the appellant attempted to raise the 
defense of coercion ( R. 4 7) . The evidence in this regard 
was that approximately two weeks prior to the escape, the 
appellant broke a radio belonging to another prisoner. The 
other prisoner indicated he wanted him to pay, but the 
appellant indicated he had no money. Thereafter appel-
lant was beat up (R. 47). Subsequently he was beat up 
two more times ( R. 50, 51 ) . The appellant requested to be 
moved to another part of the Prison for protection and 
Prison guards had informed him that the move would have 
to be okayed by higher officials ( R. 49) . On the night of the 
escape the appellant testified that he was beat up by three 
convicts and that during the course of the beating he was 
cut on the hand by one of them who had a knife. They told 
him that they were going to kill him ( R. 49). Subsequently, 
the appellant removed himself from their presence, con· 
tacted inmate Cummings and indicated a desire to attempt 
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to escape. Thereafter Cummings and the appellant hid in 
the Prison Chapel, left the Prison, climbed over the fences 
and made their get-a-way (R. 60). There was no coercion 
or threat to the appellant at the time he left the convicts 
who had beat him, at the time he was hiding in the Chapel 
or after he had left the fenced premises ( R. 58 through 60) . 
The appellant testified that he could have walked around 
to the guard tower after having climbed over the fences 
( R. 60). During the course of his testimony, the appellant 
ref used to mention the identity of the persons who were 
allegedly threatening him ( R. 52). 
The trial court struck the evidence of coercion against 
the appellant, ruling that as a matter of law there was no 
showing that at the time the act of escape occurred that 
there was an imminent threat of physical harm or injury 
(R. 62). The trial court also refused to instruct the jury on 
the issue of coercion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENSE OF COERCION IS NOT PROPERLY RAISED 
IN THE INST ANT CASE SINCE EVEN ASSUMING THE 
THREATS WERE SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE COER-
CION, THE COERCION WAS NOT DIRECTED AT THE ACT 
OF ESCAPE. 
The appellant argues that the facts in the instant case 
raise an issue for the jury on the basis that the appellant was 
coerced into escaping. The appellant relies upon 76-1-
41 (9), U.C.A. 1953, which excuses criminal guilt from: 
"Persons, unless the crime is punishable with death, who commit 
the act or make the omission charged under threats or menaces 
sufficient to show that they have reasonable cause to believe, and 
do believe, their lives will be endangered if they refuse." 
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It should be noted that the provisions of this statute require 
that the coercion be directed towards compelling the in-
dividual to commit the offense charged. This is obvious 
from the last three words, "if they refuse," which obviously 
indicate that the danger to the individual must arise from 
refusing to perform the particular act which he is beina 
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coerced into performing. Textual authorities generally sup-
port the position that the crime committed must be coerced 
and not that it be general coercion which the defendant 
relieves himself from by committing the crime. Williams, 
Criminal Law, 2nd Ed., G.P. 1961, states: 
"A crime is said to be committed under duress (or duress per minas) 
when there is a threat of physical harm in case the act be not 
done.***" 
True coercion is directed to compelling a person to per-
form a specific act and does not involve a situation where 
the person takes an alternative choice because of necessitous 
circumstances. The concept of coercion is similar to the 
concept of necessity. Russell, Crimes, 7th Ed., p. 91 ;1 Whar-
ton, Criminal Law and Procedure, Sec. 1378. 
In the instant case there was no compulsion that if the 
appellant did not escape he would be killed. The appellant 
determined himself to escape and was not told by others to 
perform the act. Consequently, the concept of coercion is 
not present as a matter of law. Since this is the only issue 
raised at trial by the appellant ( R. 4 7), the fact that the 
doctrine of necessity might otherwise be applicable cannot 
be claimed of error since, ( 1 ) it was not raised in the trial 
court, nor instructions requested thereon; and ( 2) it is not 
1 Russell states that necessity is closely related to compulsion but that it 
involves a choice of evils and not a specific compulsion towards the act done. 
The case most often cited for the concept of necessity is Regina V; Dudleid 
14 QBD 2 7 3, where the court refused to excuse British sailors from killing an 
eating their cabin boy. 
5 
raised in the case on appeal." The cases cited by the appel-
lant in favor of applying the doctrine of coercion do not 
involve situations where the appellant committed the of-
fense not because he was asked or compelled to commit the 
particular offense, but because he thought it might excul-
pate him from some other injury. All of the cases cited by 
the appellant involve situations where the individual acted 
in committing the specific crime because he was directed to 
commit the specific crime for fear of injury "if [he] refuse." 
It is noteworthy that Section 2.09 of the Model Penal 
Code recognizes the defense of duress, but does so obviously 
with the intent that the coercion be directed towards the 
act done. Thus the section states: 
"It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct 
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do 
so***." 
The cases which have specifically considered the prob-
lem of prison conditions as against the claim that escape is 
justified have refused to recognize that coercion in general, 
not directly requiring or compelling the individual to com-
mit the crime of escape, is a sufficient justification to raise a 
defense to an escape charge. To do so would be to confuse 
the concept of duress or coercion with that of necessity. 
Compare Sections 5.15 and 5.16, Clark and Marshall, 
Crimes, 6th Ed. 
In People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 Pac. 1008 
( 1929), the appellant sought to raise the contention that his 
escape was justified because he was being imprisoned under 
2 The State contends that the concept of necessity is equally inapplicable in 
this case by virtue of the fact that at the time the offense was committed there 
was no necessitous circumstance immediately imminent compelling its commis-
sion Additionally, the defense of necessity is applicable only so lo~g as the 
nrcessity lasts and since the necessity terminated in the instant case prior to the 
tirnr the escape was effected, the doctrine is equally inapplicable. 
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unsanitary conditions and that he was being subjected to 
and was in fear of inhumane punishment inflicted by the 
custodian. The court refused to recognize the defense and 
wisely noted: 
"It is manifest that to allow a prisoner to decide 'Nhether the con. 
ditions justify him in attempting to escape would be destructive of 
the necessary discipline which must be maintained in any well 
ordered prison. ~s was said in one case: 'The escape or attempt 
to escape by a prisoner, whether from a local jail or a state prison, 
tends to the general disruption of the prison discipline, and, as 
often such conduct by prisoners has caused, may be the cause of 
the slaying or serious wounding of officers or guards of the prison 
from which the escape or attempt to escape is made. Hence, such 
an act by persons legally confined in prisons or jails before their 
terms of imprisonment have expired is justly regarded as among 
the most flagrant violations of the rules governing prison disci. 
pline.' " 
Further, the court went on to note that the contentions 
made by the appellant would not excuse his escape, stating: 
"* * * It is, unfortunately, possible for the conditions of imprison· 
ment to be so unwholesome as to seriously imperil the health and 
life of the prisoner by exposure to infection and disease, and un· 
happily it is possible for prison-guards to subject prisoners to abuses 
and serious physical injury unjustified by any disciplinary need. 
However, a prisoner who escapes for any such reason does so at 
his peril." 
In a case very similar to the instant one, Hinkle v. Com· 
monwealth, 66 S.W. 816 (Ky. 1902), the appellant at· 
tempted to justify his forcible escape from the sheriff on the 
grounds that a third person was threatening to kill him, the 
third person being another prisoner. The court stated in 
rejecting the basis of the defense: 
"It also appears that the defendant claimed that one Steele, with 
whom he had had a difficulty, and from whom he had taken t~e 
pistol in question, was seeking to ?btain and threatening ~o ?btai~ 
a pistol for the purpos~ of shootm~ the defendant. This, !11 out 
opinion, does not constitute a suffic1e~t defense for the def~ndan ~ 
and did not authorize him to escape trom the deputy shenff wh 
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had the warrant of arre~t, and who, in obedience to the magis-
trate, attempted to obtam control of the defendant and disarm 
him.***" 
In Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Sec. 1378, 
the author speaks of the concept of "necessity" that may be 
a defense to an escape. Even so, however, it is stated: 
"The condition of the jail, or prison camp, or the unsanitary condi-
tion of the prisoner's cell, is not a sufficient justification for escape. 
The defendant cannot raise the defense that he escaped because of 
the insecurity of the place of his confinement." (Emphasis added). 
Other cases have clearly recognized this concept. State v. 
Davis, 14 Nev. 439, 33 Am. Rep. 563; Johnson v. State, 122 
Ga. 172, 50 S.E. 65. 
From what has been said it clearly appears that the ap-
pellant has erroneously selected his defense and, further, 
that even so, he is not entitled to raise the defense based 
upon his conduct. The appellant made no effort to seek the 
protection of the courts or bring the matter to the attention 
of the Board of Corrections by writing. It would be a serious 
weakening to prison discipline to allow a defendant to 
contend that because of some situation or condition in the 
prison which might be correctable and not be an immedi-
ate danger to his person, that he is justified in escaping. 
POINT II. 
THE FACTS IN THE INST ANT CASE DID NOT PROPERLY 
RAISE A DEFENSE OF COERCION OR DURESS. 
Even assuming that the defense of coercion or duress 
may be applicable in the instant case, from the standpoint 
of an appropriate legal defense, it is submitted that the facts 
that were before the trial court did not raise an issue of 
coercion sufficient to constitute a defense. The cases have 
generally recognized that before the defense of coercion is 
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properly raised, that there must be a present danger at the 
time the offense is committed. People v. Sanders, 82 Cal. 
~pp. 778, 256 Pac. 251 ( 1927), and that a remote danger 
is not enough. People v. Martin, 13 Cal. App. 96, 108 Pac. 
1034 ( 1910) . The danger of death or serious bodily injury 
must be present, impending and imminent. State v. Weston 
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109 Ore. 19, 219 Pac. 180 (1923); People v. Villegas,29 
Cal. App. 2d 658, 85 P.2d 480 ( 1939). Thus, in Clark and 
Marshall, Crimes, Sec. 516, p. 327, it is stated: 
"Compulsion does not amount to a defense where the threats are of 
future injury only. The threatened injury must be present and 
impending." 
In Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir., 
1935), it was stated: 
"Coercion which will excuse the commission of a criminal act must 
be immediate and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded 
apprehension of death or serious bodily injury if the act is not 
done. One who has full opportunity to avoid the act without 
danger of that kind cannot invoke the doctrine of coercion and is 
not entitled to an instruction submitting that question to the jury." 
Further, it is well recognized that the threat must continue 
during the whole of the time during which the illegal act is 
occurring. Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, 31; Clark 
and Marshall, supra Sec. 516; State v. Goode, 165 N.E.2d 
28 (Ohio App.) ; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 44, p. 136. 
Thus, in 40 A.L.R.2d 908, 910, the rule that the force and 
fear must continue throughout the time of the act is recog-
nized as respects the crime of treason. 
Applying the facts of this case to the requirement that 
the fear of death or bodily harm be imminent, it is obvious 
that in the instant case at the time the appellant effected his 
escape, the threat was no longer imminent. The appellant 
had removed himself from his tormentors, was in the pres· 
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ence of another prisoner who aided him in the escape, hid 
for a short period of time in the Prison Chapel where he was 
free from any imminent danger, was free from coercion 
after he removed himself from the immediate fenced por-
tion of the Prison, but, continued to pursue his escape and 
did so even though he was being shot at and was wounded. 
His co-defendant gave up prior to the time the appellant 
was apprehended. It is clear, therefore, that there was no 
imminent danger which would justify an instruction of the 
jury on coercion, nor did the defendant cease his conduct 
at the first opportunity, which is a recognized prerequisite. 
The trial court properly refused to give an instruction on 
the matter and ruled correctly in striking the evidence be-
cause there was no showing that at the time the offense was 
committed that there was imminent danger of death or 
bodily harm. Perkins, Criminal Law, p. 845 ( 1958). 
The appellant argues that the Utah statute cited infra, 
p. 3, does not require that the coercion be of an imminent 
and impending nature. It does not appear that the Utah 
Supreme Court has passed on this matter. However, the 
Utah statute is identical with that of California, and the 
California courts have still felt that the word "reasonable," 
as used in the statute, requires that the danger be impend-
ing, present and imminent. People v. Martin, supra; People 
u. Otis, 174 Cal. App. 2d 119, 344 P.2d 342 ( 1959); People 
v. Simpson, 66 Cal. App. 2d 319, 152 P.2d 339 (1944); 
People v. Sanders, supra; 40 A.L.R.2d 910. Consequently, 
the construction urged by the appellant of the Utah statute 
would be contrary to the construction of statutes from simi-
lar jurisdictions. This court has recognized that when the 
Legislature of a state has used the statute of another state or 
country as a guide for the preparation and enactment of a 
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statute, the courts of the adopting state will usually adopt 
the construction placed on the statute in that jurisdiction. 
and cases decided by the courts of a state from which a 
statute was borrowed, even though subsequent to the enact-
ment of the statute in a sister state, are helpful in construing 
the legislation. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 2 U.2d 
256, 272 P.2d 177 ( 1954). Further, there is substantial rea-
son for construing the Utah statute in line with common law 
principles. First, uniformity of application is achieved; 
secondly, the common law principles make certain that the 
defense raised is a genuine one and not merely an acquies-
cence in a temptation; third, the requirement of impending 
and imminent danger makes the test of reasonableness one 
capable of objective evaluation rather than one attendant 
with the vagaries of subjective analysis. 
The appellant's contention of coercion is unmeritorious. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING THE 
INSTRUCTION PROFFERED BY THE DEFENSE. 
As can be seen from the two previous points, the trial 
court did not commit error in refusing an instruction on the 
defense of coercion. First, the concept of coercion was in-
applicable to the crime charged since there was no coercion 
requiring that appellant commit the specific crime. Rather, 
at best, he made the choice and consequently, the defense 
of duress was unavailable to him. Secondly, the evidence 
clearly demonstrated beyond reason that the defendant was 
not facing imminent, present and impending harm. Con· 
sequently, there was no issue for the jury to consider and no 
reason why they should be instructed on an inapplicable 
theory. There is no error on this point. 
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CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the facts in this case disclose that the ap-
pellant has no basis for appeal. The legal theory to which 
he addresses himself for reversal is inapplicable, first, be-
cause the defense is not properly one of coercion, and, sec-
ondly, the harm to which the appellant may have been sub-
jected was not impending, present and imminent so as to 
justify his conduct. Further, it should be noted that a sub-
stantial number of authorities have of recent questioned the 
concept of duress as a defense in the absence of a showing 
that the act was in fact involuntary. For an excellent analy-
sis of the pros and cons to this position, see "A Penal Code 
Prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners," pp. 19-22, 
Calcutta Ed., in Kadish Criminal Law and Social Order, 
Vol. 2, p. 802. 
Consequently, this court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
